Québec Labour Code and the Status of Unions and Collective Agreements' Jan K. Wanczycki

The author in this article examines the status of unions and collective agreements under the new Québec Labour Code. He first présents a hrief historical review of the laws and décisions concerning this matter not only in Québec but also in the common lato provinces. He goes on stating the conditions prevailing in Québec as well as in the other provinces up to the enactment of the Code. He finally analyses the new provisions of the Labour Code governing the status of unions and collective agreements covered by it.
PART I
With the enactment of the Québec Labour Code * the question arises as to how the provisions of the Code affect the status of unions and collective agreements. Before the enactment of the Code the main provisions concerning thèse matters were contained in two Acts : The Labour Relations Act 2 and in the Professional Syndicates' Act. * The views expressed in this paper are personal views of the author and should not be considered as representing in any way the views of the Department of Labour. The author wishes to express his gratitude and thanks to Dr J. HENDRY of the Faculty of Common Law of the University of Ottawa for reading the manuscript and for helpful criticism. (1) 12-13 Eliz. II, Ch. 45, 1964. (2) R.S. Q. 1941 Q. , Ch. 162A (originally enacted in 1944 . (3) R.S. Q. 1941 Q. , Ch. 162 (originally enacted in 1924 .
It should be noted that under the Collective Agrément Act (R.S.Q. 1941, Ch. 163) a joint committee formed to administer an extended collective agreement constitutes a corporation and has the powers, rights and privilèges of an ordinary civil corporation (S. 20) . However judicial personality contemplated by this Act is granted to such a committee only but not to the unions affected by the Act Society Brand Clothes Limited v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, (1931) S.C.R. 321. 237 procédure outlined in the Act. In this respect Section 2(1) provides :
S. 2(1). Twenty persons or more, Canadian citizens, engaged in the same profession, the same employment or in similar trades, or doing correlated work having for object the establishing of a determined product, may make and sign a mémorandum setting forth their intention of forming an association or professional syndicate.
A trade union incorporated under this Act acquires, like any other corporation, a légal personality of its own, distinct from the membership, with ail the rights and obligations granted by law to a légal entity. * A collective agreement concluded by an incorporated trade union under the Professional Syndicates' Act was meant to be a civil contract enforceable by the courts. This resulted from a définition of a collective agreement as contained in Section 21 of the Act and from Section 24 regarding the effects of a collective agreement.
Section 21 reads :
S. 21. The collective labour agreement is a contract respecting labour conditions made between the représentatives of a professional syndicate, or of a union, or of a fédération of syndicates, on the one hand, and one or more employers, or représentatives of a syndicate, union or fédération of syndicates of employers, on the other hand.
Any agreement respecting the conditions of labour not prohibited by law may form the object of a collective labour agreement.
Section 24 reads :
S. 24. The collective labour agreement shall give rise to ail the rights and recourses established by the law for the enforcement of obligations
The Professional Syndicates' Act, unlike the Labour Relations Act, contained in Section 22 spécifie provisions regarding the binding force of collective agreements. Those who were bound by the agreements were the unions and employers who were parties to the agreements and those employées who were union members or those who later joined the union. But agreements were not binding on those employées who were (4) In some respects a union incorporated under the Professional Syndicates' Act had more rights than other groups incorporated under the Act. Under S. 25 an incorporated union that is a party to a collective agreement could exercise ail rights of action arising out of such agreement in favour of each of their members, without having to establish a transfer of claim by the person interested, provided that the latter has been advised and has not declared that he was opposed thereto. This provision was included in the Act in spite of the principle contained in Art. 81 of the Code of Civil Procédure that « A person cannot use the name of another to plead.., » not members of the union which had signed the agreement or of a union which later joined in such an agreement. Section 22 reads : S. 22 . The following shall be bound by the collective labour agreement :
1. The employées and employers who signed it either personally or by authorized attorney ; 2. Those who, at the time the agreement was made, are members of a group, a party to the agreement, if, within eight clear days from the deposit hereinafter provided for in section 23 of this Act, they hâve not resigned from such goup and hâve not deposited a written notice in the office of the secretary of the group and with the Minister of Labour of the Province of Québec ; 3. Those who are members of a group which later joins in such agreement, if, from the date of the notification of such adhésion, they hâve not withdrawn from the group in the manner and within the delay prescribed in the above paragraph 2 ; 4. Those who, after the deposit of the agreement, join a group which was party to such agreement.
The Professional Syndicates' Act did not contain any provision regarding settlement of disputes under collective agreement by grievance procédure or compulsory and binding arbitration.
The approach of the Labour Relations Act to the status of trade unions and to that of collective agreements had been différent. The définition of a trade union, although it included a union incorporated under the Professional Syndicates' Act, essentially was concerned with trade unions as voluntary associations without légal status of their own. This was reflected in the définition of a union in section 2(d) of the Act which reads :
5. 2(d).-«Association» includes a professional syndicate, a union of such syndicates, a group of employées or of employers, bona fide, having as object the régulation of relations between employers and employées and the study, defence and development of the économie, social and moral interests of its members, with respect of law and authority ;
The purpose of including within this définition of unions also the unions incorporated under the Professional Syndicates* Act was apparently to bring such unions within the scheme of certification and collective bargaining without affecting the status of such incorporated unions and without affecting at first when the Act was passed in 1944 the status of collective agreements and the enforcement of such agreements as provided in the Professional Syndicates' Act.
The approach of the Labour Relations Act to the status of collective agreements concluded by thèse bona fide voluntary associations of employées had been that a collective agreement is not a contract enforceable in the courts. In this respect the Act was similar to the British approach that a collective agreement should be placed in the category of a « gentlemen's agreement » binding only as a matter of honour and supported by social rather than légal sanctions. 5 The Labour Relations Act in Section 2(e) defined a collective agreement as follows :
S. 2(e) « Collective Agreement » or « agreement » means any arrangement respecting conditions of employment entered into between persons acting for one or more associations of employées, and an employer or several employers or persons acting for one or more associations of employers ;
A collective agreement under the Professional Syndicates' Act was meant to be a freely negotiated contract between the employer and the incorporated union and to be binding on only those employées who were members or later joined the union which signed the agreement.
Under the Labour Relations Act a certified association of employées in an establishment or in a bargaining unit did not represent only those employées who belonged to that particular union (as was the case under the Professional Syndicates' Act) but such an association represented ail the employées in a bargaining unit. Further, the collective agreement was not any longer purely a voluntary act on the part of the employer. According to Section 4 of the Labour Relations Act, the employer was bound to recognize as the collective représentative of his employées the représentatives of any association comprising the absolute majority of his employées and to negotiate with them, in good faith, a collective agreement. Although the employer was not obliged to conclude a collective agreement, his freedom to abstain from signing one was curtailed by the fact that the Act obliged him to negotiate in good faith and, if negotiations failed, he faced the possibility of a strike. The amendment to the Act in 1961 6 among others, in Section 24(4) 7 prohibited strikes and lockouts under any circumstances during the life of a collective agreement, and Section 24(5) 8 provided for compulsory and binding arbitration of the disputes resulting from the interprétation and application of collective agreements. The arbitration procédure was determined either by the parties to the collective agreement or was imposed by the provisions of the Québec Trade Disputes Act (R.S.Q. 1941, Ch. 167).
Also the same amendment to the Labour Relations Act of 1961 in Section 24, subseotion 6 9 provided expressly that disputes other than those regarding the interprétation or application of collective agreements, that is, the so-called « interests » disputes, must be settled in the manner provided in the agreement and to the extent therein provided.
The provision of Section 24 (5) and (6) meant that ail disputes during the life of a collective agreement, whether arising from interprétation and application of the agreement (disputes regarding « the rights »), or any other disputes (« interests » disputes) had to be settled in a manner provided in the collective agreement, and, in the case of disputes regarding « rights », by way of compulsory and binding arbitration.
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The Labour Relations Act did not make any provision for settling the disputes in Courts.
The only court action contemplated in the Act was a pénal prosecution under the Québec Summary Convictions Act for the breach of the provisions of the Act (Sections 42-50). In particular Section 44 provided :
(6) 1961 (9-10) Eliz. II, Ch. 73. (7) S. 24(4) Any strike or lockout is prohibited under any circumstances during the period of a collective agreement. (8) S. 24(5) Any complaint resulting from the interprétation or application of a collective agreement must be submitted to arbitration in the manner provided in the said agreement if it so provides, otherwise in the manner provided by the Québec Trade Disputes Act (Ch. 167). The report of the chairman of the council of arbitration shall constitute the award if a majority is lacking. In ail cases, the award shall bind the parties. (9) S. 24(6). No complaint other than those contemplated in the preceeding subsection shall be settled otherwise than in the manner provided in the collective agreement and to the extent therein provided. S. 44. Any person who fails to comply with any obligation or prohibition imposed by this act or by a régulation or décision of the Board is guilty of an offence and liable, unless another penalty is applicable, to a fine of not less than $100.00 nor more than $1,000.00 for each day or portion of a day during which the offence continues.
S. 49. Any pénal prosecution under this Act may be taken by the Board, or by any interested party with the written authorization of the Board or the consent of the Attorney General.
Pénal sanctions under the Labour Relations Act could be invoked in connection with collective agreements if the party to the agreement did not comply with the provisions regarding the grievance procédure or when it refused to comply with the arbitration award.
At one time the Québec Labour Relations Act and the Professional Syndicates Act drew a clear line of distinction regarding the nature of trade unions and the nature of collective agreements in Québec. A union had been a légal entity when incorporated under the Professional Syndicates' Act and the collective agreement entered into by such an incorporated union was a civil contract under which rights and obligations could only be enforced by civil action in Courts.
On the other hand, a trade union operating under the Labour Relations Act was essentially a voluntary bona fide association, and a collective agreement concluded by such a union was not a civil contract. The Act did not contain any provision regarding the binding force of the collective agreements. Consequently, the rights and obligations acquired under the Labour Relations Act by a collective agreement were not to be enforced by the courts but rather by other means. " Finally the 1961 amendment spelled out that such disagreements had to be settled by grievance procédure and by compulsory and binding arbitration as provided in a collective agreement or in the Québec Trade (11) The collective agreements usually provided machinery for settling disputes, or the parties could take advantage of the arbitration procédure as provided in the Trade Disputes Act.
In 1945 Section 17 was added to the Labour Relations Act which provided for grievance procédure with respect to any complaint regarding any alleged violations of the Act or of the collective agreement submitted by other association than that which was a party to a collective agreement when such an association comprises at least 20 employées, correspondu! g to at least 10 per cent of the group subject to a collective agreement.
In 1958, M.-L. Beaulieu wrote that considering the fact that the Labour Relations Act does not contain any provision for settling disputes resulting from collective agreements by court actions -it is a controversial matter whether the courts hâve jurisdiction to settle such disputes. M.-L. BEAULIEU, « Contenu, effets juridiques, application et exécution de la convention collective dans la législation du Québec », La Revue du Barreau, 1958, t. 18 With the enactment of Section 19 /a/ of the Labour Relations Act the provisions of the Professional Syndicates' Act regarding collective agreements ceased to apply to agreements entered into by incorporated unions and certified as bargaining agents by the Labour Relations Board. Such agreements ceased to be freely negotiated contracts enforced by civil actions and became agreements within the meaning of the Labour Relations Act which the employer was bound to negotiate in good faith. They acquired, like agreements negotiated by unincorporated unions this spécifie status of their own, not contracts but more than « gentlemen's agreements », because of the spécifie way of enforcing them through grievance procédure with final and binding arbitration, and ( 12 ) In a récent case VEcuyer et Autres v. Standard Téléphone and Cables Mfg. Co. et un Autre /1964 / R.J.C.S. Nos. 5 et 6, p. 339, Mr. Justice Smith of the Québec Superior Court held that a grievance resulting from the interprétation and application of a collective agreement under Section 24/5/ of the Labour Relations Act could only be submitted to arbitration as provided in the collective agreement in question and the resulting arbitration award was final and could not be changed. Further, he held that because of the provisions of the Labour Relations Act to the effect that an arbitration award under collective agreement is final and binding, such an award does not require homologation by the court under section 1431 and foll. of the Code of Civil Procédure in order that the bénéficiaires under the arbitration award could sue the company for the money due to them. Further, the court held that such action could not be launched by the union, but only by the individuals concerned. (13) 10 Geo. VI, ch. 37, s. 2, 1946. through prosecutions in case of non-compliance with the provisions regarding the settlement of disputes under collective agreements.
Section 19 /a/ did not affect the légal status of incorporated unions, whether certified or not, but changed the nature and enforcement of collective agreements, once incorporated unions were certified as bargaining agents. The application of Sections 21-26 of the Professional Syndicates' Act was narrowed down to collective agreements entered into by incorporated but not certified unions.
Such agreements continued to be freely negotiated contracts (S. 21) with civil actions as the only means of enforcing them.
Another Act in the province of Québec which caused controversy that it might affect the status of unincorporated trade unions was « An Act to facilitate the exercise of certain rights » of 1938 14 which was in 1941 incorporated in Sections 28 and 29 of the Spécial Procédure Act -. Div. VIII -Summoning Unincorporated Groups.
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The provisions of the 1938 and 1941 Acts made it possible to bring court proceedings against the voluntary associations including unincorporated trade unions in their own name. Also thèse provisions made such an association, in case of action for damages, financially liable with ail its resources. This remedy was similar to the représentative action used against collective membership of a voluntary association in the common law provinces. 16 However, where the remedy of représentative action would be used in court proceedings by or against a voluntary association, the remedy provided in Québec was limited to the proceedings against a voluntary association only. S. 28. Every group of persons associated for the carrying out in common of any purpose or advantage of an industrial, commercial or professional nature in this Province, which does not possess therein a collective civil personality recognized by law and is not a partnership within the meaning of the Civil Code, is subjected to the provisions of Section 29 of this Act. 2 Geo. VI, Ch. 96, s. 1.
S. 29. The summoning of such group before the courts of this Province, in any recourse provided by the laws of the Province, may be effected by summoning one of the ofïicers thereof at the ordinary or recognized office of such group or by summoning such group collectively under the name by which it désignâtes itself or is commonly designated or known.
The summoning by either method contemplated in the preceding paragraph shall avaîl against ail the members of such group and the judgments rendered in the cause may be executed against ail the moveable or immoveable property of such group. What the statutes purported to do, in his opinion, was to provide an easy method of exercising légal recourse against unincorporated associations by summoning ail members of the group through one of its officers or under its designated name. He concluded that it is not to be assumed that, because Secs. 28 and 29 of the Spécial Procédure Act gave légal recourse against unincorporated bodies, they likewise, by the same token, gave them légal existence.
The effect of the 1938 Act on the status of trade unions was considered again in September 1953 by the Superior Court of Québec in MacDonald v. Tobin.
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Mr. Justice Jean rejected an application for injunction to remove a trusteeship imposed on the Teamsters' local 106 in Montréal by the international président of the Teamsters' union, and to restore a former union officer, on the ground that Sec. 958, par. 2, of the Québec Code of Civil Procédure prohibits the granting of injunction to restrain exercise of any office in a public or private corporation. The plaintiff (former business agent of the union) claimed that Sec. 958 (2) was not applicable because the local in question was neither a public nor a private corporation and did not possess a légal personality distinct from its members. In rejecting this contention, Mr. Justice Jean (with référence to the judgment of the court of King's Bench in Comtois v. Navires, supra) held that, since the adoption of the 1938 « Act to facilitate the exercise of certain right » (as incorporated in Secs. 28 and 29 of the Spécial Procédure Act, R.S.Q. 1941, Ch. 342), it has been recognized that associations of persons formed with a view to achieving some common industrial, commercial or professional purposes, in the province, hâve a légal personality distinct from their members. And the holding of an office in one of such associations is similar to the holding of an office in a public or private corporation.
L'union Locale 1552 des Lambrisseurs de
In 1959, in the case of Perreault v. Poirier and Dresscutters' union, Local 205, 262 We must accordingly reach the conclusion that, while under the prevailing policy, our législation gives to unincorporated labour organizations a large measure of protection, they hâve no légal existence ; they are not endowed with any distinct personality ; they hâve no corporate entity ; they constitute merely collectivities of persons. The acts of such an association are only the acts of its members. Therefore, it cannot appear before the courts and its ofRcers hâve no capacity to represent it before the tribunals of the province of Québec where «nul ne plaide au nom d'autrui » (Art. 81, C.C.P. ).
The conclusion reached by the majority of the court was summed up in the headnote (at p. 321):
An unincorporated labour union has no légal existence and cannot be considered in law an entity distinct from its individual members and is not suable in the common name.
This was quoted with approval by Mr. Justice Rinfret in the judgment of the Suprême Court of Canada in the International Ladies Garment Workers Union v. Rothman.
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Regarding the status of collective agreements at common law, the décision of the Privy Council in Young v. Canadian Northern Railway Company 88 had been held as authority for the principle that a collective agreement is not a contract enforceable in courts.
The législation concerning labour-management relations in the fédéral fîeld of jurisdiction and in the common law provinces that emerged in the years following World War II continued the long standing common law position that trade unions are voluntary associa- tions of physical persons without a légal personality of their own and that collective agreements are rather in the nature of « gentlemen's agreements » and not contracts enforceable in courts. Thèse views were reflected in the définition of trade unions which may difiFer slightly from one jurisdiction to another but essentially describe a trade union as an organization of employées formed for the purpose of regulating relations between employers and employées, and in the définition of collective agreements as agreements between the employers and trade unions acting as bargaining agents, containing terms or conditions of employment including provisions with référence to rates of pay and hours of work.
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As to stress the common law approach to the status of trade unions and to the status of collective agreements spécifie provisions to endow trade unions and collective agreements with immunity from court action with regard to suing the unions and enforcing agreements through civil actions had been inserted in the Ontario Rights of Labour Act (ss. 3(2) and 3 (3) 35 and in the Saskatchewan Trade Union Act in Sections 23 and 24.
36 Also the Newfoundland Trade Union Act 37 (replaced in 1960) provided in S. 6 that « An action against a trade union or against any member or officiai thereof on behalf of themselves and ail other members of the union in respect of any tortious act alleged to hâve been (34) For example the fédéral Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act defines trade unions in S. 2(1) (r) as foliows : « Trade union » or « union » means any organization of employées formed for the purpose of regulating relations between employers and employées but shall not include an employer-dominated oganization.
And in Section 2(l)(d) describes a collective agreement: «-collective agreement » means an agreement in writing between an employer or an employers' organization acting on behalf of an employer, on the one hand, and a bargaining agent of his employées, on behalf of the employées, on the other hand, containing terms or conditions of employment of employées including provisions with référence to rates of pay and hours of work. committed by or on behalf of the trade union shall not be entertained by any court. » At the same time with regard to the status of trade unions some statutes made provisions granting the unions légal personality that they might be prosecuted in their own name for offences committed under the Act.
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It was left to the courts to clarify whether the provisions of the Labour Relations Act making the unions subject to prosecutions in their own name as légal persons for breach of the Act, would by implication allow the unions as légal persons to initiate prosecutions or other légal proceedings in courts. The courts ruled that in view of the clear language of thèse provisions, such an implication was not acceptable.
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As the resuit of the position taken by the courts, Section 46(1) of the Manitoba Act, which was identical with the fédéral provision, was amended in 1959 40 to empower unions to initiate prosecutions, and in a similar way the New Brunswick Labour Relations Act was amended in 1961. 41 In most jurisdictions labour législation was silent as to whether unions were able to sue or be sued in their names as légal persons. It was assumed that, trade unions being unincorporated associations at common law, the only way open to them to sue or be sued was by way of représentative action. Considering procédural difficulties and uncertainties of représentative action particularly in actions for damages against the unions 42 , in several instances court proceedings were brought (38) In this respect Section 45 of the I.R.D.I. Act reads :
S. 45(1). A prosecution for an offence under this Act may be brought against an employers' organization or a trade union and in the name of the organization or union and for the purpose of such a prosecution a trade union or an employers' organization shall be deemed to be a person, and any act or thing done or omitted by an officer or agent of an employers' organization or trade union within the scope of his authority to act on behalf of the organization or union shall be deemed to be an act or thing done or omitted by the employers* organization or trade union. by or against the unions in their names and the courts had to décide whether within the context of labour législation (or at common law) the unions had status to appear in courts in their own names.
In some cases the courts held that the unions as such hâve no légal status to appear in courts. 43 In several cases however the courts held or accepted the unions as légal entities. 44 Three décisions in this respect are of particular importance.
In held that a union not actually certified as a bargaining agent but capable of being so certified under the Act was a suable entity (persona juridica) for the purposes of implementing that Act and for causes of action that might possible be founded directly upon its provisions or breaches thereof. On appeal 47 this ruling was confirmed and Mr. Justice Sidney Smith added :
The status of unions -either as local or international bodies -to be sued in contract or tort, has not, however, been determined as yet by this Court. 48 This last aspect of légal status had been considered by the Suprême Court of Canada in the case of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No. 213 v. Henry Therien 40 when the court held that a trade union coming within the définition of that expression in the Labour Relations Act, 1954 (B.C.) Ch. 17, and particularly if it has been certified under the Act as a collective bargaining agent, is a légal entity not only for the purposes of the Labour Relations Act but under the common law and may be held liable in its name for damages either for a breach of a provision of the Labour Relations Act or under the common law (liability in contract or in tort).
In some décisions that followed this judgment, the courts held that the prnciple established in the Therien case was applicable to trade unions under labour législation in Manitoba, Ontario and under the fédéral I.R.D.I. Act. In Newfoundland, the Labour Relations Act 53 as enacted in 1950 provided in S. 46(1) for prosecution of trade unions in their name for an offence under the Act and for such purpose the union was declared to be a person. In 1960 the amendment 54 to the Act provided by adding a new S. 25A for a union's liability in damages for tortious act committed in connection with légal strikes. The new Trade Union Act enacted in 1960 55 provided in Section 5(5) that ail actions, suits, prosecutions, and complaints taken by or against a union in any court of compétent jurisdiction concerning the property of a union registered under the Act shall be taken in the name of the trustées, and « ail other actions by and against a union registered under this Act shall be taken in the name of the union ». Regarding unregistered unions subsection 7 of section 5 provided that « a union which has not been registered may be sued in its own name or in the name of any of its members ». (1) Every person vvho is bound by a collective agreement, whether entered into before or after the coming into force of this Act, shall do everything he is required to do, and shall refrain from doing anything that lie is required to refrain from doing, by the provisions of the collective agreement, and failure to so do or refrain from so doing is an offence against this Act.
It may be assumed that within the context of the provisions of the Act regarding the final settlement of différences under collective agreement and the provisions regarding prosecution for breach of an agreement as an offence under the Act, recourse to prosecutions under the Act would hâve to be preceeded by an arbitration award stating a breach of the collective agreement, unless the breach was self-evident for example in case of a union calling a strike in breach of collective agreements has been strengthened. They became the focal point of the the Act dealing with strikes and lockouts and could be prosecuted as offences under the Act or enjoined without recourse to grievance procédure.
As the resuit of thèse statutory provisions the position of collective agreements has been strengthened. They became the focal point of the whole process of collective bargaining. Protected by law, enforced by way of grievance procédure with compulsory and binding arbitration which could lead to prosecutions for breach of the provisions of the labour relations Acts, collective agreements acquired a spécifie status of their own. They became more than « gentlemen's agreements ». However statutory provisions stopped short of making them civil contracte. In récent years the arbitration boards chaired by Professor B. Laskin 60 held that the labour unions are légal entities; that for arbitration purposes a collective agreement is a contract; and, that the unions* responsibility for the conduct of their members (or of the employées in the bargaining unit) is a contractual obligation undertaken by the union towards the employer in a collective agreement. Consequently, the boards ruled that arbitration boards hâve the power to award damages for breach of collective agreements even if such powers were not specifically stated in such agreements.
One of thèse awards which granted damages against the union for breach of collective agreement because of a wildcat strike in a dispute between Polymer Corporation and Local 16-14 of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, was challenged in courts 6l and the décision of the arbitration board was upheld.
Chief Justice McRuer of the Ontario High Court ruled that a union whose labour management relations were governed by the Fédéral Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act had the capacity to incur liability as a légal entity for damages and it was within the power of the board of arbitration set up under collective agreement to award and assess damages for breach of a no-strike clause of collective; agreement. The court ruled that the arbitration board constituted under the grievance procédure as provided under the collective agreement had power to award damages for breach of the terms of the collective agreement even though such power was not expressly stated therein. Regarding the question whether the union is a légal entity under the Fédéral I.R.D.I. Act and as such liable for damages, Chief Justice McRuer held that the principle of law regarding the légal entity of a union as applied by the Suprême Court of Canada in the Therien case should apply to the union under the I.R.D.I. Act. Also, he held that when the Parliament of Canada provided in the I.R.D.I. Act for certification of a union with power to compel an employer to bargain with it and when it clothed the union with power to enter into a « collective agreement » with an employer, it invested the trade union with those corporate characteristics essential to a capacity to contract within the scope of the purposes of the Act. That being so, he added it necessarily follows from the Therien case that, since the trade union has a légal capacity to enter into a collective agreement, Parliament has imposed on it the responsibility that flows from a breach of the agreement.
Comparing the collective agreement under considération with an ordinary commercial contract, Chief Justice McRuer noted that if the collective agreement was an ordinary commercial contract, any dispute regarding the alleged violation of the agreement would be the proper subject of arbitration and the question as to whether a party who had broken a term of the contract should pay damages and in what amount, would be such a dispute. However, he stressed that a collective agreement is différent in some aspects from an ordinary commercial contract. It is not that sort of contract that can be terminated by répudiation by A party to a collective agreement or any employer, employers' organization, or a trade union, that is bound by a collective agreement, who or which is in breach thereof, is liable for gênerai or spécial damages, or both, and may be sued by any other party thereto or person bound thereby who is injured or suffers damage as a resuit of the breach.
Subsection 3 of Section 46A links this status of a collective agreement as a contract with the status of trade unions as légal entities for the purposes of civil actions by stating :
(62) In contrast to this view it should be noted that in Shipping Fédération of British Columbia and International Longshoremen's and Warehowemens Union (1959), C.C.H. Canadian Labour Law Reporter, para. 15, 277, the court found that the arbitration board did not err in deciding the question of law that a breach of an essential clause in a collective agreement discharged the union from further performance of its contractual duties towards the employer (the case referred to in Carrothers, Labour Arbitration in Canada (1961) It may be added that the amendment in question provides in Subsection 1 for gênerai liability for damage for breach of the Act (which by implication would include also liability for breach of collective agreement in subsection 2) in the following terms :
S. 46A(1) Any employers' organization, trade union, employer, employée, or person who, (a) does, or authorizes, or aids or abets the doing of anything prohibited under this Act ; or (b) fails to do anything required to be done under this; Act ; or (c) authorizes, or aids or abets in the failure to do anything required to be done under this Act ; is liable for gênerai or spécial damages, or both, to anyone who is injured or sufïers damage by the act or failure.
The provisions of the 1959 British Columbia Trade-unions Act (1959 Ch. 90, s. 1) provide in S. 4 that an employers' organization, trade union, or other person who does, authorizes or concurs in anything prohibited by the Labour Relations Act or fails to do anything required by the Act, or in case of secondary picketing, is liable in damages, this provision seems to be broad enough to allow action in damages for the breach of a collective agreement.
A question arises how the spécifie provisions of the Manitoba Act as amended providing for civil actions in damages for breach of a collective agreement would fit into the provisions of the same Act regarding compulsory recourse to grievance procédure and final and binding seulement, by arbitration or otherwise, of any différences between the parties to, or persons bound by, the collective agreement concerning its meaning, application or violation? Is there an inhérent conflict between thèse two sets of provisions? The answer seems to be in the négative. Section 46A(2) refers to a party which « is in breach » of a collective agreement. Such a breach, unless it is self-evident as in the case of a union calling a strike during the life of a collective agreement, would hâve to be ascertained first through grievance procédure including arbitration as provided in the Act under Section 19. Once such breach is found by the arbitration board the injured party would hâve the right either to prosecute for an offence under the Act (with the consent in writing of the labour Relations Board) under Section 46(1) or to sue for damages under Section 46A(2) if damages were not dealt with by arbitration. Similar procédure would be applicable under the British Columbia législation. A conflict would only arise if Section 46A(2) would grant the courts the right to ascertain whether a breach of collective agreement took place; then such provision would be in conflict with Section 19 regarding the compulsory settlement of ail différences concerning the meaning, application or violation of a collective agreement, and the legislator did not make such a provision.
This has been briefly the situation in the common law provinces regarding the status of trade unions and the status of collective agreements on the eve of the introduction of Bill 54 in the Québec législature.
PART III
Before the Québec Labour Code was enacted three versions of Bill 54 were introduced in the Québec Législature.
The question is how, during the passage of the Act, the intention of the legislator was changing with regard to the status of trade unions and the status of collective agreements and how thèse matters were settled in the Code as enacted. ( c ) « recognized association » -an association which, although not certified, has made a collective agreement with an employer or is otherwise recognized by him as the représentative of ail or some of his employées.
The définition of a trade union contained in Sec. l(a) although not identical in terms with the définition contained in Sec. 2(d) of the Labour Relations Act, is however, basically similar. It includes both the unions incorporated as professional syndicates and unincorporated unions, the former being légal entities and the latter voluntary associations without a légal personality of their own.
A new provision which had a direct effect on the status of some of the bona fide unincorporated unions was contained in Section 38 which read :
S. 38. Any certifiée! or recognized association of employées, even if not incorporated, shall hâve the capacity to exercise in its name ail its rights and recourses under this code or any collective agreement.
The wording of Section 38 implied that a « certified » or « recognized » trade union would hâve légal status similar to incorporated unions however restricted to the exercise of rights and recourses under the code or collective agreements. In this way the status of a voluntary association within the context of Section l(a) would be restricted to unincorporated unions which are neither « certified » nor « recognized ».
The wording of Section 38 did not seem to restrict this contemplated légal status to the proceedings before the Labour Relations Board or a Council of Arbitration, or before an Arbitration Board in grievance procédure under a collective agreement, but would also include any court proceedings such as, prosecutions under the Act arising from the breach of the Labour Code or collective agreement; the exécution by court action of the awards of council of arbitration or of arbitration awards under collective agreement; further, « certified » or « recognized » unions would hâve légal personality in civil proceedings in connection with prérogative writs and injunctions. However, Section 38 could not contemplate civil actions for settling grievances or other disputes during the life of a collective agreement in view of the provisions of the Code for settling of grievances by final and binding arbitration and for settling of other disagreements during the life of collective agreement by the way as provided in the collective agreement. If Section 38 was meant simply a procédural device that would enable the unions to appear in courts without affecting their status, this section would be superfluous so far as civil proceedings are concerned in view of Art. The considération is unlawful when it is prohibited by law, or is contrary to good morals or public order.
(67) S. 131. Any pénal prosecution under this code may be taken by the Board or by any interested party with the written authorization of the Board or the consent of the Attorney General.
S. 133. Any employer or association may be represented for the purposes of this code, by duly empowered représentatives.
Also the Bill contained in Sections 55 and 56 (the same Sections in the Code as enacted) provisions similar to those we find in other jurisdictions but not provided in the Labour Relations Act, regarding the binding force of the collective agreements. Section 55 stated :
A collective agreement made by a certifiée! or recognized association shall be binding upon ail the présent or future employées contemplated by the certification or récognition.
Section 56 ;
A collective agreement made by an employers' association shall be binding upon ail employers who are members of such association and to whom it can apply, including those who subsenquently become members thereof.
It should be noted, that unlike other jurisdictions Section 55 refers to the binding force of a collective agreement upon the employées contemplated by the certification or récognition but does not mention the union which is a party to the agreement.
The implication of thèse provisions is that a breach of a collective agreement is an offence under the Code and subject to prosecution (with the consent of the Labour Relations Board or of the Attorney-General) and summary conviction. Normally such prosecution would be preceded by grievance procédure where the breach of the agreement would be established.
The first version of the Bill contained also Section 57 which reads as follows :
S. 57. The provisions of the collective agreement that are applicable to an employée shall pleno jure form part of lus individual contract of employment and, notwithstanding any vvaiver, he may claim the advantages thereof.
The significance of this provision with regard to the status of collective agreements should be, considered in the light of the Privy Council's décision in Young v. Canadian Northern Railway Company.
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The circumstances of that case as summarized in the headnote, were as follows. The appellant was verbally engagée! in 1920 by a railway company as a machinist at the « going rate » of wages. He was dismissed in 1927 on the ground of réduction of staff. He sued for wrongful dismissal, contending that a written agreement entered into by the railway company with a labour organization and called « Wage Agreement No.
(68) (1931) A.C. 83. 4 », formed part of his contract of employment, and that under it the failway company could not dismiss him on a réduction in staff, as they had retained men junior to him. The agreement had been applied to the appellant (who was not a member of the organization) as to the amount of his wages, the notice given to him, and in other respects. The railway company stated that at the time they had applied the agreement to ail the men employed in their shops.
The Privy Council held that Wage Agreement No. 4 did not form part of the individual contract for the employment of the appellant. The fact that the railway company applied it to him was done not because the company was bound contractually to apply it to the appellant but because as a matter of policy the company deemed it expédient to apply the agreement to ail the employées. Further, the Privy Council held that having regard to the terms and nature of the agreement it did not by itself constitute a contract between any individual employée and his employer; observance of its terms by an employer could not be enforced by action by any employée, not even by the labour organization concerned, but only by calling a strike until the grievance was remedied.
The Privy Council decided two things : 1) that a collective agreement did not by itself constitute either a contract or part of the contract or part of the contract of employment between an employée and an employer and consequently such an agreement could not be enforced by a personal court action by the employée concerned; 2) a collective agreement was not a contract enforceable in court by the labour organization that was party to the agreement.
The inference of this décision as pointed out by B. Lepkin 69 would be that the individual employée could bring suit on the ground of master and servant relationship for a breach of a collective agreement if the terms of the collective agreement by statutory provisions were meant to form a part of individual contract of employment. Then a collective agreement could be enforced indirectly by civil action of individual employées enforcing their individual contracts of employment. If this interprétation is correct then once the terms of the collective agreement applicable to the employées would form by the provisions of Section 57 an intégral part of the individual contract of employment, an employée would hâve two ways of asserting his rights under collective agreement. The union is, by virtue of its incorporation under the Professional Syndicates' Act and its certification under the Labour Relations Act, the représentative of ail employées in the unit for the purpose of negotiating the labour agreement. There is no room left for private negotiation between employer and employée. Certainly to the extent of the matters covered by the collective agreement, freedom of contract between master and individual servant is abrogated.
The collective agreement teUs the employer on tvhat terms ne must in the future conduct his master and servant relations. When this collective agreement was mode, it then became the duty of the employer to modify his contracts of employment in accordance with its terms so far as the inclusion of those terms is authorized by the governing statutes. (italics added)
How did this compulsory check-ofï of the équivalent of union dues become a terni of the individual employee's contract of employment ? They were told by the notice that in future this déduction would be a term of their contract of employment.
and he added (at p. 355) :
The union contracts not as agent or mandatory but as an independent contracting party and the contract it makes with the employer binds the employer to regulate his master and servant relations according to the agreed terms. Thèse statements implied that collective agreements under Québec législation do not become, by opération of law, a part of individual contracts of employment. Being independent agreements between the unions and the employers, collective agreements détermine the terms which the employer and individual employées must observe if and when individual contacts of employment are entered into.
The question whether such individual contacts of employment embodying the terms of a collective agreement could be enforced directly by individual employées in a court action on the basis of master and servant relationship without recourse to grievance procédure under collective agreement was considered by Chief Justice McRuer of the Ontario High Court in Re Grottoli v. Lock and Son Ltd.
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Relying on Mr. Justice Judson's judgment in the Paquet case, supra, the Chief Justice held that the common law relationship of employer and employée is not abrogated by reason of the existence of a collective agreement by whose terms the employment relationship is governed, nor does S. 34(1) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act (R.S.O. 1960, Ch. 202) requiring arbitration of collective agreement disputes, oblige an employée to resort to arbitration, to the exclusion of court action, to assert a claim against his employer for unpaid wages. Consequently, an employée could sue under his contact of employment in the ordinary courts to recover vacation pay owed to him under the collective agreement.
The proposed Code contained also Section 58 which in the Code as enacted became Section 57, and reads as follows : S. 58. A certifiée! or recognized association may exercise ail the recourses which the collective agreement grants to each employée whom it represents without being required to prove that the interested party as assigned his claim.
The meaning of this provision is self explanatory and would apply to grievance procédure and to prosecutions under the Act. It would be applicable also in civil proceedings within the scope of Section 38 (particularly in suits in exécution of arbitration awards under collective agreements) and in this respect it would form an exception from Section 81 of the Code of Civil Procédure which provides that « a person cannot use the name of another to plead ». certified or recognized union acting under Section 58 would hâve a légal personality of its own.
Chapter IV, Division III of the Bill dealt with arbitration of grievances in basically the same way (although differing in some détails) as provided in the Labour Relations Act. Section 88 provided that every « grievance » (which according to Section l(g) means «any disagreement respecting the interprétation or application of a collective agreernent ») that is a dispute concerning « rights », lias to be submitted to an arbitration in the manner provided in the collective agreernent if it so provides «and the parties abide by it» (the last quoted words were added to the Section as enacted and the purpose of this addition is not clear); otherwise such a grievance would hâve to be referred to an arbitration officer choosen by the parties or failing agreernent appointed by the Minister. (The corresponding provision in the Labour Relations Act stated that, if the collective agreernent did not contain a provision regarding arbitration, the dispute had to be submitted to arbitration in the manner provided by the Québec Trade Disputes Act).
Section 89 provided that the arbitration award shall be final and binding the parties and may be executed under the authority of a court of compétent jurisdiction at the suit of a party who shall not be obliged to implead the person for whose benefit he is acting.
Finally, Section 90 provided that during the period of a collective agreernent any différence other than disagreements regarding the interprétation or application of collective agreements (the so-called « interest » disputes) shall be settled in the manner and to the erôent as provided in the agreernent.
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(73) Arbitration of grievances. S. 88. Every grievance shall be submitted to arbitration in the manner provided in the collective agreernent if it so provides ; otherwise it shall be referred to an arbitration officer chosen by the parties or, failing agrément, appointed by the minister. S. 89. The arbitration awards shall be final and bind the parties. It may be executed in accordance with Sec. 81. S. 90. During the period of a collective agreernent, any différence other than a grievance within the meaning of Section 1 shall not be settled except in the manner provided in the agreernent and to the extent that th agreernent so provides. S. 81. The award shall hâve the effect of a collective agreernent signed by the parties. It may be executed under the authority of a court of compétent jurisdiction at the suit of a party who shall not be obliged to implead the person for whose benefit he is acting.
The provisions of the Bill regarding the final and binding arbitration of grievances and other disagreements during the life of collective agreement left no room for the settlement of such disagreements by civil litigations (unless an employée covered by a collective agreement would launch a civil action on the basis of his individual contract of employment under Section 57). Consequently Section 59 which provided that « rights and recourses arising out of a collective agreement or an award made in lieu thereof shall be prescribed by six months from the day when the cause of action arose », and that « recourse to the procé-dure respecting grievances shall interrupt prescription », would apply in cases of prosecutions under the Code for breach of collective agreement or of an award made in lieu of collective agreement by a council of arbitration. Further, it would apply in suits for exécution of arbitration awards under grievance procédure and for exécution of awards made by councils of arbitration, and in proceedings in connection with préro-gative writs and injunctions. There would be no application of Section 59 in case of disagreements during the life of collective agreements because the first version of the bill did not provide for settling of such disagreements by civil litigation. There is a link between the status of unions and the status of collective agreements and once the Bill by Section 38 granted unincorporated unions (but certified or recognized) légal entity for the purposes of the Code, the logic of législative reasoning and the reality of labourmanagement relations might hâve lead those who drafted the Code to the conclusion contained in Section 54 making collective agreements civil contracts enforceable in courts. Also, those who drafted the Code were no doubt aware of the évolution of the common law and of statutory enactments in some jurisdictions with regard to the status of unions and collective agreement and by inserting Sections 38 and 54 they embodied in statutory provisions the trend already visible in the deci-sions of the courts and in statutory enactments (like S. 46A of the Manitoba Act) that a trade union is a légal entity and a collective agreement is a contract and that the obligations of the parties under the agreement are contractual obligations.
Although Section 54 might hâve been a logical conséquence of Section 38 and Section 57 its inclusion meant a clash of two basic philosophies of labour management relations. On the one hand the Code reflected the spécifie traditional nature of those relations based on the assumption that the unincorporated union is not a légal entity, the collective agreement is not a contract and that ail disputes related to the opération of collective agreements hâve to be settled out of courts by grievance and arbitration procédure under the Code and collective agreements. And, on the other hand by inserting in the fîrst version Section 38 and particularly with Section 54 in the second version the authors of the Code were implying a différent philosophy of labour management relations, namely, that the union is a légal entity, when certified or recognized, that a collective agreement is a contract and like any other contract it gives rise to rights and obligations which may be enforced directly in courts including actions for damages. Actually those who drafted the Code made an attempt to bring together two différent concepts of the nature of trade unions and of the nature of collective agreements as reflected respectively in the Labour Relations Act and in the Professional Syndicates' Act.
By adding Section 54 to the provisions of the Code regarding arbitration of grievances and attempt was made to combine the settlement of disputes under collective agreements by arbitration with the settlement of such disputes by the courts and, because of the inhérent incongruity of thèse two ways of settlement, the attemps failed.
How this emerging new concept of the status of unions and of collective agreements would fit into the traditional concept of enforcing collective agreements by grievance procédure and final and binding arbitration has still to be thought through. One of the ways of solving this problem is indicated by Section 46A of the Manitoba Act which seems to open court action not for the considération of disputes under collective agreement which are left to be settled by arbitration, but for actions in damages once, as the resuit of arbitration, a breach of collective agreement had been established.
In the third version of the Bill, introduced by the Québec Government in July 1964, Sections 38 and 54 and 57 were abandoned and the Code as enacted does not contain them. The resuit is that with regard to the status of unions which are not incorporated and with regard to the status of collective agreements, the Québec Labour Code returned basically to the position of the Labour Relations Act as enacted in 1944 with subséquent amendments. This means that the trade unions in Québec, whén not incorporated under the Professional Syndicates' Act, hâve the status of voluntary associations without personaHty of their own, and the collective agreements, although their status has been strenghtened particularly by provisions of SS. 55 and 56 are not contracts enforceable in courts. This leaves Québec labour législation behind the présent évolution of common law as reflected in the judicial décisions (including the Suprême Court of Canada) and behind statutory enactments in some provinces regarding status of unions and the status of collective agreements. 
LE CODE DU TRAVAIL DU QUÉBEC ET LE STATUT DES SYNDICATS ET DES CONVENTIONS COLLECTIVES
Avant la passation du Code du Travail du Québec, les principales dispositions affectant le statut des syndicats et des conventions collectives au Québec étaient contenues dans la loi des Relations ouvrières et dans celle des Syndicats professionnels. En vertu de la loi des Syndicats professionnels, un syndicat ouvrier pouvait acquérir une personnalité légale en suivant la procédure appropriée. Une convention collective signée par un tel syndicat constituait un contrat négocié librement entre l'employeur et le syndicat ouvrant des recours devant les tribunaux et liant seulement les employés qui en étaient membres ou qui l'avaient joint plus tard. La loi des Syndicats professionnels ne contenait pas de dispositions touchant le règlement des conflits pendant la durée de la convention collective par une procé-dure de griefs ou par l'arbitrage à sentence exécutoire.
Dans le contexte de la loi des Relations ouvrières, les syndicats (non incorporés en vertu de la loi des Syndicats professionnels) étaient des associations volontaires sans personnalité légale propre. Les conventions collectives signées par de tels syndicats n'étaient pas des contrats librement négociés donnant droit de recours devant les tribunaux, mais s'apparentaient à la nature des «gentlemen's agreements» conclus par les employeurs et les syndicats certifiés comme agents de négociation et liant non seulement les membres du syndicat mais tous les employés de l'unité de négociation. Les employeurs devaient négocier de bonne foi avec des agents de négociation certifiés. La loi des Relations ouvrières ne prévoyait pas le règlement devant les tribunaux des griefs relevant des conventions collectives, mais l'amendement de 1961 à la Loi prévoyait l'arbitrage obligatoire et à sentence exécutoire de ces griefs.
Le seul recours judiciaire devant les tribunaux inclus dans la Loi était une poursuite de caractère pénal en vertu de la loi des convictions sommaires du Québec pour infractions aux dispositions de la Loi. Depuis 1946, les dispositions de la loi des Relations ouvrières en regard de la nature et de l'application des conventions collectives s'appliquèrent aux conventions collectives conclues par les syndicats incorporés en vertu de la loi des Syndicats professionnels et certifiés comme agents négociateurs en vertu de la loi des Relations ouvrières. En 1938, une loi pour faciliter l'exercice de certains droits rendit possible le recours devant les tribunaux contre des syndicats non incorporés en leur propre nom. Ces dispositions furent ajoutées à l'amendement de 1960 au Code de procédure civile en permettant aux syndicats non incorporés de poursuivre en leur nom collectif.
Alors que ces amendements fournissaient une procédure qui permettait aux syndicats non-incorporés de poursuivre ou d'être poursuivis en leur nom, elle n'affectait pas la position des syndicats non-incorporés en tant qu'associations volontaires sans personnalité légale.
En régime de common law, les syndicats ouvriers comme tels avaient été considérés sans existence ni personnalité légale distincte de leurs membres individuels et conséquemment ils étaient exemptés des procédures judiciaires en leur propre nom. Les conventions collectives d'après le common law n'avaient pas été considérées comme contrats ouvrant des recours devant les tribunaux, mais plutôt s'apparentaient à des « gentlemen's agreements ». Cette approche en common law relativement au statut des syndicats et des conventions collectives s'est reflétée dans la législation patronale-ouvrière qui apparût dans les années qui suivirent la deuxième guerre-mondiale dans le domaine de juridiction fédérale aussi bien que dans la législation provinciale en common law. En même temps, en ce qui con-cerne le statut des syndicats ouvriers, certaines lois ont prévu d'accorder aux syndicats une personnalité légale afin qu'ils puissent être poursuivis en leur propre nom pour les offenses commises contre les Lois. En conséquence les tribunaux prétendaient que ces dispositions ne pouvaient pas être interprétées comme permettant également aux syndicats de poursuivre en leur nom.
En conséquence, la loi des Relations ouvrières fut amendée au Manitoba et au Nouveau-Brunswick afin d'habiliter les syndicats à poursuivre comme entités légales. Dans la plupart des juridictions, la législation ouvrière n'indiquait pas si les syndicats étaient capables de poursuivre ou d'être poursuivis en leur nom en tant que personnes légales. La présomption était à l'effet que les syndicats ouvriers étant des associations volontaires, la seule possibilité qui leur restait de poursuivre ou d'être poursuivis en justice était par la voie d'une action représentative. Dans quelques cas, cette vue fut confirmée par les tribunaux. Dans plusieurs autres cependant, les tribunaux considèrent les syndicats comme des entités légales en regard des lois de Relations ouvrières et des procédures judiciaires découlant de ces lois. Finalement, dans la cause, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, local No. 213, vs Henri Thérien (1960) 22 D.L.R. (2d) p. 1, la Cour Suprême du Canada soutint qu'un syndicat ouvrier, en vertu de la loi des Relations ouvrières de la Colombie-Britannique, est une entité légale non seulement en regard de la loi des Relations ouvrières, mais aussi du common law et peut être tenu responsable en son nom pour dommages, soit pour aller à l'encontre d'une disposition de la loi des Relations ouvrières, soit en vertu du common law.
Dans quelques décisions qui suivirent ce jugement, les tribunaux prétendirent que le principe établi lors de la cause Thérien était applicable aux syndicats ouvriers en vertu de la législation ouvrière au Manitoba, en Ontario et en vertu de la loi fédérale I.R.D.I. Cette évolution du common law en regard du statut des syndicats s'est reflétée dans des dispositions légales dans quelques provinces. L'approche originelle du common law qui apparentait les conventions collectives à des « gentlemen^ agreements » s'est changée à la suite des dispositions légales concernant le caractère exécutoire des conventions collectives, la méthode de faire appliquer de telles conventions par l'arbitrage obligatoire et à sentence exécutoire, et en raison des dispositions qui faisaient d'une infraction à la convention une offense en vertu de la Loi et objet de poursuite. Ceci amena les tribunaux (incluant la Cour Suprême du Canada) dans la cause Polymer Corporation and OU Chemical Atomic Workers International Union, Local 16-14 (1961) Avant la passation du Code du Travail du Québec, trois versions du bill 54 furent présentées à la Législature québécoise. La première version du bill défi-nissait un syndicat d'une façon fondamentalement semblable à la définition contenue dans la loi des Relations ouvrières. La définition incluait à la fois les syndicats incorporés comme syndicats professionnels et les syndicats non-incorporés, les premiers étant des entités légales et les derniers des associations volontaires. Cependant, le Bill ajoutait une nouvelle disposition (S. 38) par laquelle un syndicat « accrédité » ou « reconnu » devait posséder une personnalité légale quoique restreinte à l'exercice des droits et recours selon le Code du Travail ou toute convention collective. En conséquence, le statut d'associations volontaires devait être restreint aux syndicats non-incorporés n'étant pas « certifiés » ni « reconnus ». La définition de convention collective était semblable à celle contenue dans la loi des Relations ouvrières et reflétait l'approche selon laquelle une convention collective ressemblait à un « gentlemen's agreement », et non à un contrat donnant recours devant les tribunaux. Le Bill contenait des dispositions concernant le caractère exécutoire des conventions collectives qui considérait une infraction à de telles conventions comme une offense en vertu du Code et pouvant faire l'objet de poursuites et de convictions sommaires. La première version du bill prévoyait aussi que les dispositions de la convention collective applicables à un employé feraient partie pleno jure de son contrat individuel d'emploi et que l'employé pouvait ré-clamer les avantages de telles dispositions (S. 57). Cette disposition devait permettre aux employés de faire valoir leurs griefs en vertu des conventions collectives directement devant les tribunaux et conséquemment cette disposition venait en conflit avec les dispositions du Code concernant le mode obligatoire de règlement des griefs en vertu de la convention collective en dehors des tribunaux par voie d'arbitrage obligatoire et à sentence exécutoire.
La seconde version du bill 54 prévoyait qu'« une convention collective donne ouverture à tous les droits et recours prévus par la loi pour la sanction des obligations. » Le libellé de la section 54 impliquait l'abandon de l'approche qui apparentait les conventions collectives à des « gentlemen's agreements » et qui était fondamentalement celle de la loi des Relations ouvrières et de la première version du Code, et qui rendait les conventions collectives des contrats civils permettant recours devant les tribunaux. La section 54 venait en conflit avec les dispositions concernant l'arbitrage obligatoire et à sentence exécutoire des conflits en vertu des conventions collectives.
La troisième version du Bill laissait tomber les sections 38, 54 et 57; en conséquence le Code ainsi adopté retournait au concept contenu dans la loi des Relations ouvrières du Québec à l'effet que tous les syndicats (exceptés ceux incorporés en vertu de la loi des Syndicats professionnels) sont des associations volontaires sans statut propre et que les conventions collectives ne constituent pas des contrats donnant recours devant les tribunaux.
